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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MICH IO TOMINO,
PlaintiffRespondent,

Case No. 14835

vs.
GREATER PARK CITY
COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
DefendantAppel lant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Defendant submits the following brief in response to
certain new matters raised in the Brief of Respondent:
I.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN STRIKING DEFENDANT'S
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THIS ERROR IS PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT FOR REVIEW
Defendant's principal contention on this appeal is that
the trial court erred when i t struck the affirmative defense from
defendant's original answer.

This order was erroneous, whether

the motion upon which it was based was made pursuant to Rule 12
or, as plaintiff now insists, Rule 56.

In either event, plaintiff
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fell far short of meeting the burden of a party moving for
summary disposition of an affirmative defense.

In Respondent',

Brief, plaintiff refuses to discuss the standards that govern
either a Rule 12 or a Rule 56 motion.

Plaintiff realizes, it

appears, that his showing on the motion did not meet the standa:
of either rule.
In Appellant's Brief, the showing that plaintiff had
to make is discussed in terms of a Motion to Strike, since the
Rule 12 designation that plaintiff had chosen for the motion ru
afoul of the requirement that pleadings must be "closed" before
a motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper, and the purpo
of the motion was, in fact, to strike a defense . 1

In Responden'.

Brief, plaintiff carefully avoids any discussion of the burden
he had to carry on his motion.

Instead, he dismisses any con-

sideration of this burden as a "procedural bag of tricks."
He is content to point out that his motion was perfectly proper
as one for partial summary judgment and leave it at that.
Plaintiff's motion for summary disposition appeared tc
be a Rule 12 motion.

No affidavits were filed with it.

the opening round of pleadings were before the court.

Only

Even

plaintiff thought i t might be a Rule 12 motion and named it

1. Defendant does not claim as plaintiff implies a~
pp. 14-15 of Respondent's Brief, that i t was error to hear. t e

motion, but only that it was improper to consider it a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
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"Motion for Judgment on the Pleading or • .

However, when

it is called to plaintiff's attention that, as a Rule 12 motion,
it cannot be for judgment on the pleadings and appears to be a
motion to strike, plaintiff asks that Rule 12 be forgotten, and
that the motion be considered "

• for Partial Summary Judgment. "

Plaintiff points out there was nothing wrong
with the motion as one for partial summary judgment.

While this

is true, the motion would more appropriately be considered as
a motion to strike.

Of course, a "Motion to Strike or for Partial

Summary Judgment" would have had an odd ring and compelled more
careful attention to plaintiff's burden.

Professor Moore has

stated, "If a motion for summary judgment is based solely on the
pleadings, as it may be, then there is no functional difference
between that motion and a motion for judgment on the pleadings."
6 J. Moore Federal Practice ,, 56.09 at 65-166 (2d Ed. 1976).
The same thought would apply to a motion to strike and a motion
for summary judgment.

Clearly, if a motion denominated as a

motion for partial summary judgment is equivalent on the face
of the pleadings and the state of the records to a motion to
strike, then it must be governed by the law of Rule 12, not
Rule 56.

If the rule were otherwise, a party could choose the

relatively less stringent standards of Rule 56 over the standards
of Rule 12 by merely choosing to name his motion one for summary
judgment.

-3-
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Even if plaintiff's motion is considered

a motion

for partial sununary judgment, it did not meet the requirements of Rule 56.

This rule requires that before a summary

judgment may be granted, the moving party must show "

that ther 0

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movin:
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

This Court

has said, "Such showing must preclude all reasonable possibili:
that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor."

Bullock v.

Deseret DodgeTruck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 5, 354 P.2d
559

(1960).
The trial court erroneously accepted plaintiff's

position that the Purchase Agreement itself established
that plaintiff had no duty to act in good faith to obtain the
franchise. 2

Plaintiff had made no showing that would justify

2. The trial court would have had to determine that
the meaning of the contract was "plain and clear" without any
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding its formation. The,
error of this is discussed at pages 16 through 22 of Appellant
Brief.
On the same subject, Corbin says,
"It is sometimes said that if the words of a contract
are plain and clear, evidence of surrounding circumstances to aid interpretation is not admissible. But
some of the surrounding _circumstances always mus~ be d
shown before the meaning of the words can be plain an
clear; and proof of the circumstances may make a
meaning plain and clear when in the absence of su~h
proof some other meaning may also have seemed plain
and clear." 3 Corbin on Contracts § 542 (1961)
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this conclusion in the face of the burden that it must appear
to a certainty that plaintiff would succeed in spite of any
facts that could be proved in support of the defense,3 or
that there was no reasonable possibility that defendant could,
given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain
a judgment in his favor.

The trial court's conclusion to

the contrary disregarded the rule stated by this Court in
Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 {Utah
1975) :

"We accept the correctness of [the] argument that there is implied in any contract a
covenant of good faith and cooperation, which
should prevent either party from impeding the
other's performance or his obligations thereunder; and that one party may not • • . take
advantage of the non-performance he has caused."
{Emphasis added) .
The trial court also ignored the language in the contract concerning the "intention of the parties" which was called to
its attention,4 the contradictions between its determination
and the language of the agreement, and the substantive legal
principles governing the construction of contracts of
purchase and sale and conditions precedent.
are discussed in detail in Appellant's

B~ief

These matters
in terms of

3. This is the burden on a motion to strike.
Lehnann Trading Corp. v. J & H Stolow, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21
(S .D • N • Y • 19 6 0) .

4.

See p. 10 , infra.
-5-
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of the standards for a motion to strike.

The arguments made

there are equally applicable to a motion for surrunv.ry judgment
Plaintiff's bare assertion that this motion was not
improper as a motion for summary judgment does not establish
that the necessary showing was made to have the motion grant,:
In fact, plaintiff's only statement with respect to "burden,"
at page 17 of his brief, is that the burden was on defendant
to raise issues of fact.

Plaintiff does not talk about

this subject because he has nothing to say.
failed to meet his burden.

He clearly

This court has said repeatedly

that upon a motion for summary judgment the contentions of
the party opposing the motion should be considered in a light
most favorable to that party, with all doubts resolved agains:
the moving party and in favor of permitting the issue to
to trial.

~

Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60

(1967); Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d
420, 413 P. 2d 807 (1966).

A somewhat elaborate statement of

this burden, incorporating many federal cases is as follows:
"The courts are in entire agreement that the
moving party for summary judgmenthas the .
burden of showing the absence of any genuine
issue as to all the material facts, which,
under applicable principles of substantive
law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of
law.
The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.
To satisfy his burden, the n!ovant must make a
showing that is quite clear what the truth is,
and that excludes any real doubt as to ~he
existence of any genuine issue of material fact.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Since it is not the function of the trial court
to adjudicate genuine factual issues at the
hearing on the motion for sununary judgment, in
ruling on the motion all inferences of fact
from the proofs proffered at the hearing must
be drawn against the movant and in favor of the
party opposing the motion. And the papers
supporting the movant's position are closely
scrutinized, while the opposing papers are
indulgently treated, in determining whether
the movant has satisfied his burden."
6 J. Moore Federal Practice ~I 56.15[3] at 56-463472.
Defendant submits that when plaintiff's motion was granted,
substantial doubts remained as to what the truth was, and these
doubts were resolved in favor of plaintiff, the moving party.
The Purchase Agreement was treated indulgently in support
of plaintiff's contentions, and scrutinized closely (or
ignored completely)
contentions.

insofar as it supported defendant's

These errors fatally infected the subsequent

proceedings.
Plaintiff wants the motion considered one for summary
judgment, not because he complied with his burden on such a
motion, but because he can impute a certain remissness to
defendant's counsel for not having affidavits before the
court concerning the Sheraton Franchise.

Plaintiff says:

"Therefore, [because the hearing on the
motion had been continued several times], counsel
for Defendant had four months in which to raise
any issue they wanted to raise, in which to ~ile
affidavits, in which to submit memoranda (which
they did . . • ) , or to raise any questions they
desired."
(Resp. Brief at 16).
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If it was a Rule 56 motion, these statements make

s 0 me slight

sense, not in relationship to the rules governing the motion,
but in a crude practical sense: shouldn't one file affidavit;
on a motion for summary judgment, even if the opposition has
not.

If the sense of this is granted, then one can also

impute a quality of ungentlemanly conduct to present counsel
for even broaching the subject of what standard governs the
motion for summary disposition on an affirmative defense:
"[C]ounsel for Defendant, not having represented Defendant at the time of Judge Croft's
Summary Judgment, are seeking to raise issues for
the first time on appeal in hopes of relitigating,
virtually de novo, issues previously handled by
other counsel, who, in their own judgment, either
neglected or did not feel it appropriate to raise
the issues now raised .

* * *
. now being dissatisfied with the previous
handling of the case and with the benefit of
'twenty-twenty hindsight' , counsel seeks to raise
newborn issues, de novo on this appeal."
(Resp. Brief at I4 & 16) .
And defendant's present counsel may not appreciate
certain facts that were once clearly recognized:
"Both parties went forward on the motion,
full-well knowing that the only evidence before
the Court was the written contract itsel~
The parties clearly recognized that the issue
presented on the motion was one which could be
resolved by the contract itself and witho~t the
need for additional evidence."
(Resp. Brief at
16-17.)
All of this, of course, is nonsense.

Defendant's original
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counsel had every right to proceed on plaintiff's motion
as they did, and to rely on the pleadings, the contract, and
the standards governing such motions for sununary disposition,
without filing an affidavit or submitting extrinsic evidence.
Plaintiff claims that the presentation of the standards governing motions to the attention of this court,
raises "new issues on appeal."

(Resp. Brief at 14-17).

These standards are not "issues", but rules of law governing
the disposition of motions to strike or motions for summary
judgment.

Such fundamental rules governing motion practice

cannot be disregarded merely because they are not explicitly
argued to the trial judge.

They are one of the fundamental

premises from which consideration of any motion for summary
disposition begins.
Plaintiff also claims that the parol evidence rule
was never presented as an issue to the trial court.

Again,

the parol evidence rule is not an "issue"; it is rule of
law for determining whether an issue should be decided only
from the contract itself or whether extrinsic evidence may
be considered.

In this case, defendant pled, as an affir-

mative defense, that plaintiff failed to use good faith
efforts to obtain the franchise.

Clearly, the question of

whether the parties to the Purchase Agreement intended that
good faith be a part of the contract was in issue.

It might
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be determined, on a more appropriate hearing, that the
contract was integrated, but, for the reasons set out in
Appellant's Brief, it was not appropriate to make this determination on a motion for summary disposition.

Yet it is

obvious that such a preliminary determination was necessary
to the trial court's ruling.
In fact, the issues raised by the parol evidence rule
were presented to the trial judge, although the rule was
not called by name.

The memorandum filed by defendant in

opposition to the motion for summary disposition of its affir·
mative defense begins as follows:
"THE TERMS OF THE PURCHASE CONTRACT AND THE
PLEADINGS HEREIN RAISED AN ISSUE AS TO THE
DUTY OF THE CONTRACT PURCHASER TO MAKE A
REASONABLE EFFORT TO OBTAIN A FRANCHISE.
"Paragraph 26 of the Contract between the
parties provides in its entirety as follows:
"26.
It is the intention of the parties
that the Inn and all other facilities constructed by Purchaser upon the Subject
Property will be operated pursuant to a
franchise granted by Sheraton Inns, Inc.,
which shall identify the same as a
Sheraton Inn or by a similar name and shall
provide for reservation, supervisory and
other services customary with Sheraton
Inns, Inc., franchises.
[Here the memo sets
out the balance of ,, 26) [Emphasis in
original memorandum.)
"The above-quoted language stresses the
intention of the parties that a Sheraton
Franchise can be obtained and the importance
t
of obtaining such a franchise.
It is clear tha
a reasonable and good faith effort be made by
-10-
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the purchaser to secure the franchisR . . .
(Emphasis added)
(R. 65-66)

"

Clearly, defendant argued that the Purchase Agreement itself
showed that plaintiff must use "reasonable and good faith
efforts to secure the franchise."

Plaintiff, on the other

hand, argued that the intent of the parties was clearly that
no good faith efforts to obtain the franchise were required.
Thus, the intent of the parties was squarely before the trial
judge.

Whether or not on oral argument the parol evidence

rule was mentioned, the evidentiary problems that the parol
evidence rule governs were before the trial court.
Plaintiff confuses "issues" with "arguments" when he
states that these "issues" were not raised below.
5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal

&

In

Error §546 at 32, it is said:

"The rule requiring adherence to the theory
relied on below does not mean that the parties
are limited in the appellate court to the same
reasons or arguments advanced in the lower court
upon the matter or question in issue."
See also First Nat'l Bank of Mayfield v. Gardner, 376 S.W.2d
311, 314 (Ky. 1964); Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 173 U.S.
193, 43 L.Ed. 665, 19 sup. Ct. 379 (1899).

The issue below

was whether or not the affirmative defense was so clearly
insufficient that it could properly be stricken upon a
motion to dispose of it summarily.

This is precisely the

issue presented to this Court.
The cases cited by plaintiff in support of his

-11-
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contention concerning "new issues on appeal" i'n f

ac

t ·
invol%'.

new issues or theories, not arguments, that had not been
presented in the trial court.

In Meyer v. De 1 uke, 2 3 Utah

(1969), the defendant sought for the firs:

2d 74, 457 P.2d 966

time on appeal to interpose a defense of unconscionability
or unclean hands, 2 3 Utah 2d at 7 8 •

In In Re Es ta te of Ekker,

19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967),

appellant, a protestant

in a will contest, contended for the first time on appeal
"that the will is void because of material mistake of fact
and law appearing on the face of the will;

[and] that the

testator was suffering an insane delusion at the time he
executed the will;

.

•

"

In both of these cases this

Court clearly rejected the consideration of new "issues" or
"theories" on appeal.

In neither of them nor any other case

which defendant could discover has this Court stated that it
will not consider arguments in support of an issue raised in
the trial court if the argument was not explicitly presented
to the trial court.
II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT
IS AN ALTERNATIVE CONTRACT, THE ORDER
WAS ERRONEOUS
After dismissing as a "procedural- bag of tricks"
any consideration of the standards governing his motion for
.
the "merits
summary disposition, plaintiff deigns to discuss
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of Judge Croft's Order" granting the motion.

It? must be

remembered that this discussion is in reference to an order
granting a "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for
Partial Summary Judgment," which, of course, presupposes that
the moving party had met a stringent burden.

Plaintiff

would have it assumed, without discussion, that there is no
other reasonable possibility than that the parties to the
Purchase Agreement intended that the purchaser could "obtain
the Sheraton Franchise and proceed with the contract or • . •
alternatively . . . not obtain the Sheraton Franchise, reconvey the property, and pay interest
of termination."

(Resp. Brief at 24.)

• to the period [sic]
Plaintiff relies,

too, on the unspoken assumption that even with all inferences
from the contract drawn against him and for defendant, and
with plaintiff's position on the contract closely scrutinized
and defendant's position indulgently treated, it is still
quite clear what the truth is: no real doubt exists that
any considerations of plaintiff's good faith in the Sheraton
Franchise application should be sticken from the proceedings.
All this is true, plaintiff contends, because the Purchase
Agreement is a contract for alternative performance.
It is necessary for plaintiff to leave certaiR premises unspoken and ambiguous in this argument.

It might be

thought, if it were not for other language to the contrary_
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that defendant is arguing that an alternative contract cannn,
have conditions on the alternatives. 5

This is contradicted

by the Utah case plaintiff cites, Bradbury v. Fillinga~, 84
Utah 178, 35 P.2d 772 (1934), in which the co:-itract required
that one alternative be performed by a certain date.

In

the Purchase Agreement in our case, these words seem to
state a condition to an election to terminate under paragraph 26:

"In the event that such franchise . . . is not

obtained •

II

Plaintiff does not argue that, if theH

words state a condition, no promise to use good faith
efforts to obtain the franchise is implied.

Such an argu-

ment would fly in the face of overwhelming authority.6
Instead, plaintiff takes a much more daring position:

"That such franchise is not obtained" is not a con-

dition at all, but an element of performance:
"In the instant case, under paragraph 26 as
i t is written, the purchaser may fulfill the contract in one of two ways - he may obtain the
Sheraton Franchise and proceed with the contract
5.
"Nor is this a case where the purchaser is
seeking to avoid liability by refusing to perform a condition precedent • . . • Appellant has conveniently ignored the entire concept of alternative performance even
though that was stressed and argued extensively before 11
Judge Croft at the time the motion was originally heard.
(Resp. Brief at 23.)

6. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); see generally, 3 Corbin on Contracts § 570 (1961), "Implied promises to perform a condition or to render co-operation that is necessary to
another's performance."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or he may, alternatively, not obtain the Sheraton
Franchise, reconvey the property, and pay interest
on the total purchase price for the period from the
date of the contract to the period of termination."
(Resp. Brief at 24-25, emphasis added.)
And again:
"[T]he failure to obtain the • • . franchise
was
. merely an alternative performance under
the contract . . • . " (Resp. Brief at 25.)
This is a remarkable argument.

It is difficult to believe,

particularly with the certainty required for summary judgment,
that the parties to the Purchase Agreement had any interest in
the purchaser abstaining from efforts to obtain the Sheraton
Franchise, or acting so as not to obtain it.

Why would the

seller require that the franchise be obtained if the contract
is performed according to its primary purpose but require
that it not be obtained if the purchaser wishes to perform
pursuant to another alternative.

If it is not a condition

on the alternative of termination, it is difficult to see why
"not obtaining the franchise" is mentioned at all.

Why did

the parties not say simply, "In the event purchaser gives GPCC
notice not later than June 15, 1974, it shall have the right
to reconvey the property to GPCC and pay interest."

How

can a "failure to obtain" a franchise be performance.

What

reasonable (or rational) parties would include it as an
element of performance.
Of course, parties can enter into enforceable
contracts that seem irrational or unreasonable, but the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rules of construction require a reading that is reasonable,
if possible.

7

In this action, all that is required to impute

to the parties something approaching rationality is to construe the words "franchise is not obtained" to be a conditioo,
not a statement of performance expected.

Plaintiff's con-

struction impels to the conclusion that the parties were
somewhat daft.
Paragraph 26 of the Purchase Agreement does not fit
the concept of an alternative contract very well in any event.
The purchaser's first "alternative" - payment of the full
purchase price and construction of the Sheraton Hotel - is
bargained for in return for the conveyance of the land in
fee by the seller.

The second "alternative" - reconveyance

and payment of interest - is bargained for in return

for

the return by the seller of all purchase monies paid and
the termination of all other obligations under the contract.
The seller's obligation is clearly different, depending on
the "alternative" chosen by the buyer.

The concept of

alternative performance, as stated by the authorities,
does not comprehend such a difference:
"If, upon a proper interpretation of the
contract, i t is found that the parties have agreed
that either one of the alternative performances
is to be given by the promisor and received by

7. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life~
Vale, 213 Ind-:--6°01-;-12 N.E.2d 350 (1938).
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the promisee as the agreed exchange and equivalent
for the return performance rendered by the promisee,
the contract is a true alternative contract."
Corbin on Contracts § 1082 (1964).
The case of Pearson v. Williams, 24 Wend. 244 (N.Y. 1840),
cited by plaintiff, illustrates this principle: the plaintiff
conveyed land, a single performance, for the return performance
by defendant of erecting two brick houses or, in the alternative, paying $4,000.00.
Plaintiff points out that there are differences
between paragraphs 8 and 26 of the Purchase Agreement.
Paragraph 8 makes explicit mention of diligence in the pursuit
of certain permits.

Paragraph 26 makes no explicit mention

of diligence in pursuit of the Sheraton Franchise.

Plaintiff

claims for this comparison that it leads "to the obvious
conclusion that

[the parties] knew the language with

which to accomplish [the] result" of imposing "some affirmative obligation on the part of the purchaser to use diligence
in obtaining the Sheraton Franchise."

Defendant submits

that with this same linquistic talent the parties could
easily have made of paragraph 26 the simple statement of
alternative performance that plaintiff claims for it.
That they did not do so lends absolutely no credence to the
interpretation of the contract urged by the plaintiff.
Certainly, there is no logical reason to infer that because
a promise or condition is ext>ress with respect to one subject,
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it must be express with respect to .another subject or
not exist at all.8
III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION
CONCERNING FORFEITURE ivAS IMPROPER

Plaintiff enumerates seven "facts" which, he contend,
were "present glaring, and totally persuasive" of the proposition that, even if plaintiff is not entitled to invoke
paragraph 26, the provisions of paragraph 25 are unconsionabl'
and the sum to be paid under paragraph 26 is about right in
any event.
These "facts" are arithmetical and appear on the
face of the contract or the pleadings: The purchase price was
$630, 000. 00; the period between February 7 and June 13 is
approximately four months; interest on the purchase price
for four months is $21,024.99; and the purchaser had paid
$125,000.00 toward the purchase price.

Plaintiff gets

three separate facts from the statement that a deed was never
delivered to plaintiff and plaintiff never took possession.
These facts are indeed "clear."

But not one

of them goes to the question of what "realistic view of 1~ 5
• .

• might have been contemplated by the parties" when the

liquidated damages provisions were agreed to.
Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673

8.

(1973).

Jensen v ·
Plaintiff

See generally, 3 Corbin on Contracts § 5
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64 (19611

would rather

disrega~d

any consideration of what the parties

intended when they entered the contract and decide whether
liquidated damages are an unconscionable forfeiture on
the basis of such criteria as "percentage" and "time lapse."
However, this court has said repeatedly that it will not
interfere with the bargained-for provisions of a contract to
declare a liquidated damage provision a forfeiture, unless
it appears that the forfeiture could not reasonably have been
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract
was entered.

There is simply no evidence in the record to

indicate what the parties might have had in mind when the
liquidated damage provisions were drafted.

Without such

evidence, the conclusion that this provision is unconsionable is clearly improper.
Even if the conclusion were proper, there is absolutely nothing in the record in this case or any place else
to support plaintiff's statement that "Chase brass [sic?]
interest on the total purchase price ($21,000.00) is certainly
a sufficient and reasonable award to defendant for any _damages
it could conceivably suffer."

(Resp. Brief at 35.)

If, in-

deed, the liquidated damages provisions are an unconsionable
and unenforceable forfeiture, then damages must be determined according to the usual rules (see authorities cited
at page 33 of Appellant's Brief.).
-19-

Plaintiff does not even
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attempt to justify the damages of $21,000 · 00 as compl y1ng
·
with these rules, but makes the simple declaration that it
"is certainly a sufficient and reasonable award to defendan•
for any damages it could conceivably suffer."

There is no

law that supports such a measure.
VI.

CONCLUSION
The judgment in this case cannot be supported
either by arguments that good faith was not required of
plaintiff or by arguments that the liquidated damage
provisions were a forfeiture.

Nor is there any merit in

plaintiff's argument that the finding that Development
Services acted in good faith.is supportable.
However, it is not the judgment that is so much in
error as the first order entered in this case.

This order

striking the affirmative fatally infected the remaining
proceedings.

The subsequent partial surrunary judgments were

the logical consequence of this order.
evidence at trial was limited by it.

The presentation of
The procedural

imbroglios that plaintiff recounts with repressed delight
were the result of defendant's attempts to impress into the
record tbe evidence that the t:r;ial court improperly decided
it did not need to hear.
Defendant should be given a fair chance to have

-20-
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its case heard.

The judgment should be reserved.
Respectfully submitted,
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD & GELDZAHLER

-~i;;

By

I-

I

,

/1 L;~ --lL~ l---_
F/ S.cPrince, CJt., Esq.
J~ Rand Hirschi, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant
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